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Comments
Transactional Immunity Under The
California Water Code: Advance Pardon
For Crimes Revealed?

Eighty-four percent of the American public believes that damage

to the environment caused by business is a serious crime.' According
to a recent survey by Arthur D. Little, an international management
and technology consulting firm, three out of four Americans think
corporate executives should be held personally liable for environmental offenses.2 Increasingly, federal and state prosecutors are
complying with public sentiment and criminally charging companies

and executives who fail to obey environmental laws.' To ensure
1. Environmental Damage Rated As Most Serious Among Business Crimes: Corporate
Executives Shoul Be Held Liable, Survey Shows, ELU, July 8,1991, availablein WESTLAW, BNA
Directory, ELU file.
2. I (statement by Mary I. Woodell, a director in Arthur D. Little's Environmental, Health,
and Safety Consulting Practice and manager of the firm's Crisis Management Unit, claiming that it
is apparent that people do not look to companies simply for quality performance or a good bargain,
but that the public increasingly expects the corporations and their employees to take responsibility
for the conduct of the corporation).
3. See Elizabeth S. Kiesche, GetiLng Tougher On Violators, CHEMICAL WEEK, August 21,
1991, at 49 (stating that the shift in public sentiment to protect the environment is energizing the
stricter and more severe enforcement of environmental legislation, and furthermore, that in 1990, the
United States Department of Justice indicted 134 corporations and individuals for environmental
violations, compared with only 94 indictments in 1986); Enforcement Actions At EPA Continue to
Climb in Ci CriminalCases,PenaltyAssessments, ELU, Nov. 26,1991, availablein WESTLAW,
BNA directory, ELU file (stating that in fiscal year 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency
referred 474 civil and criminal cases to the Department of Justice, and of those referred cases, the
Department of Justice charged 104 defendants in criminal actions, which resulted in 27 organizations
and 45 individuals being convicted and sentenced); 1991 Polluters Were Assessed $7 Million in
Environmental Fines, ELU, Feb. 27, 1992, available in WESTLAW, BNA directory, ELU file
(stating that new enforcement initiatives focusing on previously ignored violations, such as failure
to submit hazardous waste reports, were part of the reason that polluters in Illinois were assessed a
record $7 million in environmental fines in 1991, an increase of 19 percent over 1990); United States
v. Frank J. Jordan, No. CR-91-414-MA (D. OR Mar. 25,1992) (WESTLAW, BNA directory, ELU
file) (accepting a guilty plea from a former environmental control supervisor of Ore-Idaho Foods, Inc.
for violation of the Clean Water Act, and noting that the guilty plea carries a maximum sentence of
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compliance with environmental laws and regulations, prosecutors are
attempting to deal more harshly with violators by requesting that they

receive more than a stiff fine; they are seeking imprisonment for
executives.4 In California, the Legislature has assisted prosecutors
by enacting a wide variety of statutes that protect the environment
and provide severe penalties for violators.5

two years and a maximum fine of $250,000); Massachusetts v. Polyply, Inc., No. 29111-29118
(Mass. Super. Ct. Bristol County, Mar. 2,1992) (WESTLAW, BNA directory, ELU file) (convicting
a Massachusetts firm that had been indicted on charges related to the illegal storage and disposal of
hazardous waste, and fining the firm $400,000); California v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., No. 9824
(Cal. Super. CL Mono County, July 8, 1991) (finding the Walker River Irrigation District guilty of
Fish & Game Code violations); Massachusetts v. Wolkon, No. 89748-89754 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Norfolk County, Dec. 17, 1990) (WESTLAW, BNA directory, ELU file) (sentencing the president
of a Massachusetts electroplating firm to two years in prison and a fine of $75,000, after the president
plead guilty to charges of illegally disposing of hazardous waste). See generally Stephen Herm,
CriminalEnforcement of Environmental Laws on FederalFacilities,59 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 938
(1991) (discussing the difficulties of applying the same environmental standards required of private
parties, corporations, and state and local governments to the federal government); Robert W. Adler
& Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising The Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781 (1991)
(discussing the effect of two cases that heightened the media and public attention on the criminal
enforcement of environmental laws); Herbert G. Johnson, State And Local Environmental Criminal
Enforcement, 496 A.L.I. - A.B.A. 29 (Apr. 19, 1990) (discussing the increasing proportion of
environmental criminal cases that are brought at the state level using state enactment and
enhancement of specific federal environmental control statutes that contain criminal sanctions);
Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENvTL AFF. L. REv. 379 (1986)
(discussing the history of environmental regulation by criminal sanctions and the current use of
federal environmental statutes, focusing on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, and the Clean Water Act).
4. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER Er AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND PoucY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SocIrf 321-56 (1992) (discussing the force that criminal law plays in environmental cases);
see also Steven Ferrey, Hard Time: CriminalProsecutionfor Polluters, 10.4 AMicus J. 11 (Fall
1988) (examining what impact and difficulties are involved in prosecuting a criminal case against
corporations and individuals when the indictments are based on environmental violations). See
generally Marsha S. Croninger & Eric P. Berezin, EnvironmentalReporting andthe Fifth Amendment
Under California'sNew CorporateCriminalLiability Act, 409 PRAc. L. INST. 113 (1991) (discussing
California Penal Code § 387, which makes it a crime punishable by fine and/or imprisonment for any
corporation or manager to knowingly conceal any serious danger from the Division of Occupational

Safety and Health and the corporation's employees, and the effect that § 387 will have on
corporations and their managers).
5.
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PRos. CODE § 7028.1 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring any contractor
who performs or engages in asbestos-related work to obtain certification); itl § 17508.5 (West Supp.
1992) (requiring any consumer good manufactured or distributed, which contains an environmental
representation, to meet specified definitions); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5650 (West 1984) (making
the depositing of pollution, permitting pollution to pass into, or placing pollution where it can pass
into the water of the State, a strict liability violation); id. § 5650.1 (West Supp. 1992) (making every
person who violates § 5650 subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each violation);
id. §§ 12000-12020 (West Supp. 1992) (setting out the fines and penalties for any violation of the
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Valiant efforts by criminal prosecutors may be compromised,
however, by statutes that absolutely prohibit prosecution of a person
if that person has been compelled to testify or produce evidence
before an administrative body.6 Sections 1105 and 1106 of the
California Water Code are such statutes. They compel a person to
testify or produce evidence before the California State Water
Resources Control Board (Board) if so directed by the Board.7 More
importantly, the sections provide immunity to any person who is
compelled to testify or produce evidence before the Board.8

Fish & Game Code, or any rule or regulation thereof); CAL. FooD & Aoluc. CODE §§ 12999.4-13061
(West Supp. 1992) (establishing the penalties for the violation of any provision of Division 7Agricultural Chemicals, Livestock Remedies, and Commercial Feeds Division); CAL. HEALTH &
SAPE=Y CODE § 1024 (West 1990) (stating that falsification, concealment, destruction, and omission
of any material facts are punishable by fine and/or imprisonment); idL § 25189.5(a)-(c) (West 1984)

(making the negligent disposal, or transport, of hazardous waste at an unpermitted facility or
unauthorized point a violation subject to fine and/or penalty); id § 25189.5(d) (West 1984) (making
the acts under (b) or (c) of § 25189.5, which cause great bodily injury or substantial probability of
death, a violation subject to fine and/or imprisonment); CAL. PENAL CODE § 370 (West 1988)
(making anything which is injurious to health, indecent, offensive, or an obstruction to the free use
of property, or free passage of any lake, bay, river, stream, public park, square, street or highway a
public nuisance subject to fine and/or imprisonment); id. § 387 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that
any corporation or person who is a manager of a product, facility, equipment, process, place of
employment, or business practice, is guilty of a public offense if the corporation or person has actual
knowledge of a serious concealed danger, knowingly fals to inform the Division of Occupational
Safety and Health in writing, and warn the affected employees in writing of that danger); CAL. PuB.
Rns. CODE § 4601 (West 1984) (making it a unlawful for any person to willfully violate any
provision of the Z'Berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973, and subjecting the violator to a fine
and/or imprisonment (or the violation); id. § 5093.68 (West 1984) (requiring a timber operator to be
responsible for the actions of his or her employees, and stating requirements to temporarily suspend
timber operations in special treatment areas adjacent to wild and scenic rivers); CAL WATER CODE
§ 13271 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring that any person, regardless of intent or negligence, who causes
or permits any hazardous substance to be discharged, or where the waste will probably be discharged,
in or on any waters of the state to notify the Office of Emergency Services and the appropriate state
board, and stating that the failure to provide notice will be punished by fine and/or imprisonment);
id. § 13387 (West Supp. 1992) (making any person who intentionally or negligently violates §§
13375 or 13376 of the Water Code, or who violates or introduces into the water a hazardous
substance which the person knew or should have known would cause personal injury or property
damage, subject to criminal penalties).
6.
See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing a type of statutory immunity that
can prohibit criminal prosecution).
7. CAL. WATER CODE § 1105 (West 1971); see infra notes 112-129 and accompanying text
(providing the text of section 1105 and discussing the statute's meaning and effect).
8. CAL. WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971); see infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text
(outlining the text of section 1106 and discussing the meaning and effect of the statute).
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The type of immunity granted under section 1106 is termed
transactional immunity.9 Transactional immunity broadly guarantees
that no criminal prosecution will result from any crime implicated or
revealed by the person whose testimony or evidence was compelled,
provided that the testimony or evidence compelled was relevant to
the proceedings."° Thus, when sections 1105 and 1106 are implicated in a Board hearing or investigation, the statutes can thwart the
state's attempt to prosecute environmental violators because of the
broad guarantee against prosecution for any crimes revealed."
This Comment analyzes the transactional immunity granted by
California Water Code sections 1105 and 1106 in light of the public's
changing attitude toward environmental crimes. Part I discusses the
judicial development of statutory immunity by the United States
Supreme Court. 12 Part II analyzes the texts and legislative history of
sections 1105 and 1106.13 Part III observes the application of
sections 1105 and 1106 in the context of a recent case.' 4 Finally,
Part IV examines transactional immunity in light of California's
environmental concerns, and proposes legislative action to remedy
the prohibition against prosecution when sections 1105 and 1106 are
applicable."

9.

See infra note 63 and accompanying text (describing how the language of the statute

indicates that § 1106 grants transactional immunity). See generally 2 PAuL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENSES § 205(b) (1984) (discussing transactional immunity).
10. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (defining transactional immunity).
11. See infra notes 130-58 and accompanying text (discussing the application of §§ 1105 and
1106 to a recent case).
12. See infra notes 16-102 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 103-29 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 130-58 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 159-94 and accompanying text.
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I. IMMUNTY

The history of immunity begins with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."6 Both the United
States and the California Constitutions provide that a witness cannot
be required to testify against himself or herself in a criminal
prosecution. 17 Yet, the United States Supreme Court has held that
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination is not limited to criminal prosecutions.is
Therefore, a witness may invoke the privilege in any proceeding,
whether it be a civil or criminal case, administrative or judicial
hearing, or an investigatory or adjudicatory function."9
The Supreme Court has further held that before the Fifth Amendment privilege may be invoked, the court must determine whether the
witness will be implicated by a direct answer under the circum-

16. See Maffie v. United States, 209 F. 2d 225, 227 (1st Cir. 1954) (stating that our
forefathers made a judgment and expressed it in the Fifth Amendment, that it was better for an

occasional crime to go unpunished than it was that the prosecution should be able to build a criminal
case, in whole or part, with the aid of enforced disclosures by the accused). See generally2 DAvID
S. RUDsTeN, Er At, CRIMINAL CoNSIU'rnoNAL LAW, § 6.0211] (1990 & Supp. Oct. 1991)

(discussing the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); James G. Kay, Fifth
Amendment At Trial, 79 GEo. L.J. 1043 (1991) (reviewing the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in the United States Supreme Court and the United States Courts of
Appeals during 1989-90).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (providing that no person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself in any criminal case); CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 15 (providing that a person may not be
compelled to be a witness against themselves in a criminal proceeding); see CAL. EVID. CODE § 940
(West Supp. 1991) (providing that to the extent such privilege exists under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter
that may tend to incriminate the person); see also Gonzales v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57,
62, 178 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (4th Dist. 1980) (citing Cohen v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 61,
67, 343 P.2d 286, 289 (1959)) (stating that the interpretations that the United States Supreme Court
places on the language of the Fifth Amendment should be very persuasive to the California courts
when interpreting article I, § 15, because the provisions are substantially the same).
18. See Amdstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71,72-73 (1920) (quoting Counselman v.Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892)) (stating that the provision of the Fifth Amendment which states "any
criminal case" must be broadly construed in favor of the right it was intended to secure, and that the
object of the privilege was to insure that a witness, in any investigation, would not be compelled to
give testimony which might make it look like the witness had committed a crime).
19. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,92 (1964) (White, J.,
concurring); McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34,40
(1924) (stating that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination can be maintained in any
proceeding, whether it is civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory).
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stances.2" In determining whether the answer will implicate the

witness, the court must determine whether the information could be
a "link in the chain" of evidence which could lead to the criminal
prosecution of the witness.2 1 Additionally, the witness may not
assert the privilege merely by declaring that an answer will be
incriminating.' Rather, the Supreme Court has required that the

fear of incrimination must be apparent from the implications of the
question in the context in which the question is asked.2" Therefore,

the witness must demonstrate that a responsive answer to the
question, or an explanation of why it cannot be answered, might be
2 4
damaging because it could result in harmful disclosure.

Additionally, the Court has required that before the Fifth Amendment
privilege may be invoked, the fear of incrimination must be reason-

20. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951) (stating that the trial judge, in
appraising the claim of a witness's Fifth Amendment privilege, must look to his own personal
perception as well as to the peculiarities of the case and the facts in evidence); Mason v. United
States, 244 U.S. 362,364-65 (1917) (stating that it is the court that is to consider and decide whether
a direct answer to a question can implicate the witness).
21. See Hoffran, 341 U.S. at 486 (explaining that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends not
only to answers that would themselves support a conviction under a federal statute, but that the
privilege also encompasses those answers which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the claimant for a crime); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950) (stating that
if answers to the questions asked by the grand jury would have furnished a link in the chain of
evidence needed in a prosecution of the witness, then under the Constitution the witness had a right
to remain silent); see also Troy v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1012-13, 231 Cal. Rptr.
108, 111-12 (1986) (holding that where no criminal prosecution was pending, nor was there any
investigation which might lead to a criminal prosecution, defendant was denied the shield of the
privilege). In Troy the court stated that the mere fact that there is a pending criminal prosecution does
not entitle the defendant to invoke the privilege. Id. at 1012, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 111. The information
required to be disclosed must serve as a link in the chain of evidence. Id.; Cf.Gonzales v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 57, 63, 178 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361 (1980) (stating that the relevant question
is whether the evidence sought from the witness might tend to incriminate, even though no criminal
proceeding or investigation was underway). The court in Gonzales allowed the petitioners to invoke
the privilege where their answers could lead to information or evidence and the answers would be
both relevant and damaging if the district attorney ultimately decided to bring criminal charges. Id.
at 64, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
22. Hoffrman, 341 U.S. at 486; see Brnmswick Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108, 110 (9th Cir.

1981) (holding that answers by the claimant helping the other party collect its debt does not amount
to incrimination within the scope of the privilege, nor is a bald assertion of the privilege,
accompanied by nothing else, sufficient) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981).
23. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87.
24. Id at 486-87; see Troy, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1009, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (quoting the

language in Hoffman and Brunswick which states that it must be evident from the implications and
the setting of the questions, that if the witness answered, harmful disclosure would result).
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able under the circumstances, and not pure speculation where no
criminal prosecution nor investigation is pending.' Consequently,
the Court has required that the danger of incrimination must be
26
real.
Another aspect of the Fifth Amendment privilege, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, is that the privilege applies only
to natural persons.27 Therefore, a corporation cannot claim the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.28 Furthermore,
since corporations and other arti-ficial organizations cannot claim the
privilege, an individual acting in a representative capacity on behalf
of the organization, is likewise precluded from asserting a personal
privilege to justify refusal to produce an organization's records.29

25. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at486 (stating that the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment
privilege is limited to instances where the witness has a reasonable basis to apprehend danger from
a direct answer); see also Troy, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1012, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (stating that in a
judgment debtor proceeding where no criminal prosecution or investigation was pending, the witness
could not claim his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination).
26. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917); see McMartin v. County of Los
Angeles, 202 Cal. App. 3d 848, 860, 249 Cal. Rptr. 53, 59 (1988) (holding that the fact of a pending
criminal prosecution, by itself, does not permit a witness to invoke the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination); Troy, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 1009, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (stating that it is not
enough for the witness to fear incrimination from answering a question, but the witness must have
a reasonable fear in light of the specific circumstances).
27. See George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968) (stating that
well settled federal law provides that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a personal
one, applying only to individuals).
28. Id
29. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (describing the major theme of the
constitutional privilege as the protection of individual privacy which cannot easily be alleged by an
individual working for a organization where the records are regulated by statute or by the rules and
regulations of an organization); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (announcing the
general rule that the privilege could not be employed by an individual to avoid production of the
records of an organization, where the individual holds a representative capacity as custodian on behalf
of the group); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1913) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment may not be claimed by an individual to justify the refusal of business records even
where the corporation had previously been dissolved); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74, 79-80
(1913) (holding that the principal that the privilege does not apply to individuals in their
representative capacity, also pertains to the records of a dissolved corporation even though the records
were in the possession of the individual who had been the corporation's sole shareholder); Dreier v.
United States, 221 U.S. 394, 398 (1911) (holding that there would be no privilege when the subpoena
was directed to the individual corporate officer); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376-82
(1911) (holding that an officer of a corporation could not claim his privilege against compulsory selfincrimination to justify a refusal to produce the corporate books and records in response to a
subpoena duces tecum directed to the corporation).

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
While the United States and the California Constitutions guarantee the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination," the
government often has legitimate demands when it seeks to compel
citizens to testify.3" As a result of the government's need for
compelled testimony, immunity statutes were enacted to accommodate the government's need for valuable testimony, while
continuing to protect the individual from harmful disclosures.32
Immunity is generally defined as a right of exemption from a
penalty.33 Therefore, immunity from prosecution means that a witness has the right to be exempted from prosecution.34 Accordingly,
granting immunity eliminates the reason for invoking the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination because
it removes the danger of criminal prosecution.35 Witnesses are
required to testify or produce evidence where immunity has been
granted, because there is no longer the risk of self-incrimination and

30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (stating the provisions of the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution which guarantee that a person cannot be compelled to
be a witness against himself or herself in any criminal proceeding).
31. See Kastigar,406 U.S. at 445 (1972) (stating that many offenses are committed such that
the only persons able to give useful testimony are often those that are implicated in the crime);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (stating the importance of testimony for the

discovery of crimes for which evidence would otherwise not be obtainable); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591,610 (1896) (asserting that enforcement of the interstate commerce law or other comparable
laws would become impossible without immunity statutes, where claiming the privilege is in the
interest of both accused parties in order to conceal their criminal activity). See generallyFRANIcS
WHARTON, 1 WHARTON'S CRmIAL LAw § 78 (14th ed. 1978) (discussing that where the
prosecution has little or no evidence against several suspects, it would be better to grant immunity

to one person in order to obtain convictions against the others, rather than letting all go free).
32. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL4 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 8.11 (1984) (discussing immunity and compelled testimony).
33. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1991) (defining immunity).
34. Id; see Segretti v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 878, 886-87, 544 P.2d 929, 933, 126 Cal. Rptr.
793, 797 (1976) (holding that immunity is not a protection against attorney disciplinary proceedings
because the proceedings do not constitute a criminal penalty); Piemonte v. United States 367 U.S.
556, 559 (1961) (holding that the witness's fear for himself and his family was not a valid or legal
excuse for failing to testify after a valid grant of immunity); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,
430-31 (1956) (holding that the immunity statute is only required to protect the individual from
criminal prosecution or criminal penalty and is valid, and may be invoked even though the witness
may suffer public disgrace, loss of job, or other adverse effects).
35. See L. LEvy, ORaws OF ThE FIFTH AlmMmr 328,495 (1968) (stating that soon after
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination became fimnly established in law, it was
recognized that the privilege did not apply when immunity had been granted).
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criminal prosecution.36 This principle was made clear in Ullmann
v. UnitedStates, 37 where the Supreme Court explained that the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not prevent compulsory disclosure of
criminal evidence,
but rather it protects against punishment for the
33
revelations.
Historically, government officials have employed three types of
immunity to compel testimony from unwilling witnesses who invoke
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the
federal and state constitutions: Direct use immunity,39 transactional
immunity,' and use plus derivative use immunity.41 Although no
longer Constitutionally valid,42 direct use immunity simply meant
that the compelled testimony or evidence would not be used directly
against the witness at a subsequent criminal proceeding against that
witness. 43 Direct use immunity allowed the prosecution to use evidence obtained indirectly from the witness's testimony, or evidence
against the witness, in a subsequent criminal proceeding. In
6 4 the United States Supreme Court first
Counselman v. Hitchcock,
addressed a constitutional challenge to a direct use immunity
statute.40 The case involved the revised 1868 Immunity Act which
provided that no "evidence obtained from a party or witness by
means of a judicial proceeding... shall be given in evidence, or in
any manner used against him ... in any court of the United

36. See UVlmann, 350 U.S. at 439 (holding a suspected spy in contempt after he was granted
immunity and thereafter refused to testify); In re Application of Critchlow, 11 Cal. 2d 751, 756, 81
P.2d 966, 969 (1938) (stating that a legislative grant of immunity in exchange for testimony

terminates the self-incriminating nature of the testimony).
37. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
38. Id. at 438-39. See generally Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, The Privilege
Against CompelledSelf-Incrimination, 16 WM. MNrrcrH L REv. 249 (1990) (addressing the history
and current understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination).
39. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (defining direct use immunity).
40. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (defining transactional immunity).

41.

See infira notes 82-83 and accompanying text (defining use plus derivative use immunity).

42.

See infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text (discussing the United States Supreme

Court's rejection of direct use immunity).
43. See Counselnman v. H-itchcock, 142 U.S. 547,564 (1892) (describing direct use immunity
as prohibiting the use in a subsequent prosecution of only the actual use of the statement or evidence
produced under compulsion).
44. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
45. Kastigar,406 U.S. at 449.
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States." During a grand jury investigation inquiring into alleged
violations of an act regulating interstate commerce47 by the officers
and agents of various railroads,48 Charles Counselman was served
with a subpoena and called to testify.49 As sole owner of Charles

Counselman & Co., a grain and commission business, Counselman
was questioned as to whether he had obtained rates lower than the
tariff or open rate for shipments of grain into Chicago by the various
railroad companies. 50 Counselman declined to answer the question,
and several others of similar nature, on the ground that his answers
might tend to incriminate him.51 Counselman was ordered to testify
pursuant to the 1868 Immunity Act.52 Counselman refused to testify
before a federal grand jury, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination." Consequently, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
Counselman in contempt of court for refusing to testify. 54
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court construed the 1868
Immunity Act as protecting a witness only against the direct use of
the specific testimony compelled from the witness under the grant of
immunity.55 According to the Supreme Court, the statute as written
could not, and would not, prevent the use of Counselman's testimony
to search out other evidence that could be used against him.56 Since
the statute would permit the use, against the immunized witness, of
evidence derived from the witness's compelled testimony, the

46.

27 Stalt. 443, ch. 83 (1893).

47.

24 Stat. 379, ch. 104 (1887) (amended by 25 StaL 855, ch. 382) (1889) (also referred to

as the Interstate Commerce Act).
48. The officers and agents being investigated were the employees of the Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railway Company; the Chicago, St. Paul & Kansas City Railway Company; the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company; and various other railroad companies having lines
in the district of Northern Illinois. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 548.

49.

Id at 548.

50. Id at 548-49.
51. Id at 549-50.
52. Id at 552.
53. Id
54. Id Counselman was fined $500 and the cost of the proceedings, and was directed by the
court to be taken into custody by the marshall until he answered all of the questions asked and until
he paid the fine. Id
55. Id at 564.

56.
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Supreme Court determined that the immunity statute did not protect
the witness to the same extent as a claim of the Fifth Amendment
privilege would protect the witness.5 Thus, Counselmanestablished
the principle that a grant of immunity is insufficient to compel
testimony over a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege, unless the
immunity's scope co-extends with the scope of the Fifth
Amendment. 5 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court
upheld Counselman's refusal to testify.59
In response to Counselman, Senator Cullom introduced a new
immunity bill in Congress sixteen days after the Supreme Court
decision.' The bill became the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893
(Act).61 The Act was drafted specifically to meet the broad language
in Counselman, where the Supreme Court had stated that in order to
withstand scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment, a statute granting
immunity must provide absolute immunity against future prosecution
for the offense to which the question relates.62 The specially drafted

57. Id
58. 1& at 585.
59. Id at 586.
60. 23 CoNe. R c. 573 (1892). Counselnan was decided Jan. 11, 1892. Senator Cullom
introduced the new bill on Jan. 27, 1892. Senator Cullom advised Congress that enforcement of the
Interstate Commerce Act would be impossible in the absence of an effective immunity statute. 23
CONG. REc. 6333 (1892). To remedy the problem, the newly introduced bill removed the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination in hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission by
enacting an immunity statute which provided that:
[No person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise....
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, 27 Stat. 444 (1893); see infra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining that
the language of this statute was later termed transactional immunity, and became the basis for
numerous federal and state immunity statutes).
61. Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (1893) (providing transactional immunity
to a person compelled to testify or produce evidence before the Commission). The Act was later
repealed by the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 245, 84 Stat. 931
(1970).
62. 23 CONG. REc. 573, 6332-33 (1892) (Senator Cullom stated that unless a bill was passed
to provide a witness with complete protection from criminal prosecution, as decided by the Supreme
Court in Counselman, then the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts would be "entirely
unable to enforce the law upon the statute book[s]"); 24 CONG. RE.. 503 (1893) (Congressman Wise
introduced the bill in the House and argued that the whole scope and effect of the introduced bill was
simply to meet the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Counselman);see Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, 28-29 & n.36 (1948) (stating that the 1893 provision was enacted merely to
provide an immunity statute that would be sufficiently broad enough to be an adequate substitute for
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provision of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 supplied the
model for what was later termed transactional immunity. 63
This second type of immunity broadly guarantees that no prosecution may proceed against a person for any crime implicated during
that person's testimony or production of evidence, as long as the
information revealed is relevant to the compelled evidence. 4 Thus,
transactional immunity provides the broadest protection for the
witness because it guarantees absolute immunity from criminal
prosecution for the information disclosed by the compelled evidence.
Transactional immunity is, in effect, an advance pardon for crimes
revealed by the witnesses during their testimony, whereas direct use
immunity only protected
the witness from the actual use of his or her
65
evidence.
compelled
Four years after Counselman held direct use immunity statutes
constitutionally insufficient, the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a transactional immunity statute in Brown v.
Walker.' The Brown case involved a challenge to the Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893, which granted transactional immunity to a

the Fifth Amendment privilege, since the statute in Counselnan had been found not as effective to
protect the witness as the constitutional privilege).
63. See Kastlgar, 406 U.S. at 451-52 (stating that the 1893 statute became the basic form for
numerous federal immunity statutes); [ll/mann, 350 U.S. at 438-39 (declaring that the 1893

Compulsory Testimony Act had become part of the 'constitutional fabric' and has been included, with
virtually the same language, in substantially all of the major regulatory acts of the federal
government). The 1893 statute was also the basis for many California statutes. See, e.g., CAL. BUS.
& PROF. CODE §§ 16758, 17087 (West 1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25531 (West Supp. 1992); CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 18676, 18677 (West 1980); CAL INS. CODE § 784 (West 1972); id. § 12924 (West
1988); CAL PENAL CODE § 414a (West 1988); id. § 1324 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE

§§ 1795, 3741,5258 (West 1975); CAL WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971). Although a discussion
of these statutes is beyond the scope of this Comment, the basic argument for change is generally
applicable to each.
64. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1991) (defining transactional immunity as
affording immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his or her compelled
testimony relates); see also MeLain v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 2d 109, 118, 221 P.2d 300, 305
(1950) (holding that a witness given transactional immunity is immunized from prosecution for any
offense implicated by the witness's compelled testimony, which is relevant to the proceeding, whether
or not the testimony would have been used against the witness). See generally ROBINSON, supra note
9, at § 205(b) (defining and discussing transactional immunity).
65. 2 B.E. WrmN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Witnesses, § 1393 (3d ed., 1986) (stating that
because transactional immunity provides absolute protection from criminal prosecution before a
witness testifies, it actually pardons the witness in advance for the crimes revealed by the witness).
66. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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witness who testified or produced evidence before the Interstate
Commerce Commission if the testimony or evidence would tend to
incriminate the witness.67 A grand jury which was investigating
charges that officers and agents of a railroad company had violated
the Interstate Commerce Act, subpoenaed Brown, an auditor for the
company, to testify pursuant to the Compulsory Testimony Act of
1893.68 Brown, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, refused to answer certain questions
concerning the railroad's operations and rebate policy.69 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ordered
Brown to appear before the court and give reasons why he could not
answer.70 The district court found Brown's reasons for refusing to
testify insufficient.71 Consequently, the court directed Brown to
reappear before the grand jury and answer the questions.72 When
Brown again
declined, he was held in contempt of court and
73
imprisoned.
The Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
dismissed Brown's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and Brown
appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the
Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 was unconstitutional.74 In
reaching the question of whether the Act violated the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment is
one of the most valuable privileges of citizens.75 Nevertheless, the

Court in Brown found that the immunity granted under the Act met
the Fifth Amendment's concerns, and therefore the witness should

67. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Compulsory Testimony Act
of 1893 and stating that once immunity was granted, the immunity statute guaranteed that the witness
could not be criminally prosecuted for any crime revealed by relevant testimony, thereby displacing
the danger protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination).
68. Brown, 161 U.S. at 592.
69. Id
70. Id at 593.
71. Id Brown's answer that he would suffer from "odium and disgrace" was not sufficient
to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id at 609.
72. Id at 593.
73. Id Brown was ordered to pay five dollars and was taken into custody until he answered
the questions propounded by the grand jury. Id
74. Id at 591.
75. Id at 610.
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have answered.76 Even though the immunity statute compelled
testimony, the Court explained that the Act protected the witness
from criminal prosecution which might be assisted directly or
indirectly by the witness's disclosures.' Therefore, because Brown
was protected from prosecution, the Act did not violate Brown's Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.7"
After Counselman and Brown, it appeared that the only acceptable type of immunity was transactional.7 9 However, more than 70
years later in Kastigar v. United States,"0 the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of certain statutes which provided a third
type of immunity-use plus derivative use immunity."' Use plus
derivative use immunity, sometimes referred to as "use" immunity,
prohibits the compelled testimony from being used directly against
the witness.8 2 In addition, under use plus derivative use immunity,

any evidence that was directly or indirectly derived from that testimony is also prohibited from being used against the witness in a
subsequent criminal case. 3 Use plus derivative use immunity

76. Id.
77. Id at 608.
78. Id at 608-10.
79. See iadat 595 (upholding the transactional immunity statute because it precluded the
prosecution of offenses related to the compelled statement or evidence); Counselman, 142 U.S. at 586
(stating that in view of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, a statute
must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the crime to which the question relates).
80. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
81. Md at 453; see 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) (providing that the witness may not refuse to
testify based on his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination where an order is issued
under § 6002, but that no testimony or information compelled under the order may be used directly
or indirectly against the witness in any criminal case, except perjury or failure to comply with the
order); 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1988) (stating that if an individual has been or may be called to testify,
the United States district court where the proceeding is, or may be,held shall issue an order pursuant
to § 6002 if the information or testimony may be necessary to the public interest and the individual
has reffsed or is likely to refuse to testify or give information based on his privilege against selfincrimination).

82.

See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1991) (defiming use plus derivative use

immunity). See generallyMoylan & Sonsteng, supra note 38 (discussing the background of immunity
and the progression of the United States Supreme Court to use plus derivative use immunity).
83. See BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1991) (defining use plus derivative use
immunity); see also Zicareli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 476-78
(1972) (upholding a state statute which granted use plus derivative use immunity only for
"responsive- answers). See generally ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 205(c) (defining and discussing
use plus derivative use immunity).
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differs from transactional immunity, an absolute bar to criminal
prosecution, because use plus derivative use immunity still allows the
prosecution the opportunity to prosecute the witness for crimes
implicated or revealed during the witness's testimony.' However,
the prosecution must demonstrate that the evidence was not derived
either directly or indirectly from the witness's prior testimony. 5
In Kastigar,a United States grand jury ordered Kastigar and
others to appear on February 4, 1971, in the Central District of
California. 6 Prior to the scheduled appearances, the government,
believing that Kastigar and the others were likely to assert their Fifth
Amendment privilege, applied to the district court for an order
granting immunity to Kastigar and the others pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
sections 6002 and 6003.'7 The order directed Kastigar and the others
to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand jury while
granting the witnesses use plus derivative use immunity as provided
under 18 U.S.C. sections 6002 and 6003."8
Over Kastigar's opposition, the district court ordered Kastigar
and the others to appear before the grand jury and testify under the

84. See generally RoBINsoN, supra note 9, at § 205(d) (discussing the practical differences
between transactional immunity and use plus derivative use immunity).
85. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commn, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964) (holding that the
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects a state witness against
incrimination under federal as well as state law, and a federal witness against incrimination under
state as well as federal law). The Court in Murphy also stated that once a defendant demonstrates that
he has testified under a state grant of immunity (transactional or use plus derivative use), to a matter
related to the federal prosecution, the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their
evidence was not procured, either actually or derivatively, from the state proceeding. Id, at 79 n.18.
This must be done by establishing that the prosecution had an independent and legitimate source for
the debatable evidence. Id. A majority of courts that have considered the issue of the prosecutor's
burden have held that the prosecutor need show only by a preponderance of the evidence that the
evidence advanced against the defendant is derived from legitimate and independent sources. See,
e.g., United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gregory, 730 F.2d
692, 698 (1 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); United States v. Rogers, 722 F.2d 557,
560 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 982 (5th Cir. 1974) C'Seiffert IW")
(applying the preponderance standard); see also Nelson v. Municipal Court, 28 CaL App. 3d 889,
891-92, 105 Cal. Rptr 46, 48 (1972) (holding that a state witness cannot be compelled to testify
where such testimony may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and

evidence found therefrom cannot be used in any manner by the federal government in connection
with the federal prosecution).
86. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 442 (1972).
87. Id,; see supra note 81 (discussing 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003).
88. Kasdgar,406 U.S. at 442.
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grant of immunity. 9 The district court found Kastigar and the others
in contempt of court when they refused to answer the grand jury's
questions." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
findings of the district court, and the United States Supreme Court
subsequently granted certiorari. 91
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court maintained
that although a grant of immunity must provide protection equal to
that afforded by the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory

self-incrimination as held in Counselman,the immunity granted does
not have to be broader. 92 Thus, the Court in Kastigarrecognized
that because transactional immunity flatly prohibits the criminal
prosecution of crimes implicated or revealed by the witness's
testimony, transactional immunity would provide the witness with
considerably broader protection than the Fifth Amendment privilege.93 The greater protection of transactional immunity is evident
from the Supreme Court's determination that the sole purpose of the
Fifth Amendment privilege is to provide protection against being
compelled to testify where the imposition of criminal penalties may
be attached, and not the purpose that the individual may never be
prosecuted.' To satisfy that level of protection, the Supreme Court
held that immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as
evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, must be
granted. 95 The Court in Kastigarconcluded that this level of protection would prohibit the prosecutorial authorities from using the
compelled testimony in any respect. 96 According to the Court, use
plus derivative use immunity therefore insured that the testimony
would not lead to criminal penalties. 97 Since the immunity from
both the use and the derivative use was coextensive with the scope of

89.

Id The immunity was granted under 18 U.S.C. § 6002. Id

90.

Id

91. Stewart v. United States, 440 F. 2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. grante4 402 U.S. 971
(1971) (No. 1562).
92. Kastigar,406 U.S. at 453.

93.

Id

94.

Id

95.

Id

96.

Id

97.

Id
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the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination," use plus
derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel testimony over a
claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege.99
In summary, to protect a witness to the extent required by the
Fifth Amendment from punishment for revealing criminal evidence,
the United States Supreme Court has approved two kinds of
immunity-use plus derivative use immunity'0° and transactional
immunity. Although a grant of transactional immunity is constitutionally valid, it is much broader than the Fifth Amendment privilege
10 Use plus derivative use
which it was meant to supplant."
immunity, on the other hand, is equally protective of an individual's
rights under the Fifth Amendment without providing the overbreadth
of transactional immunity. °2 The distinction between transactional
immunity and use plus derivative use immunity is critical when
determining the nature of protection afforded to the individual while
considering California's ability to effectively prosecute environmental violators.
II. CALFORN1A WATER CODE SECTIONS 1105 AND 1106
In 1913, the California Legislature enacted the Water Commission Act,"0 3 incorporating the existing 1913 statutes which laid out
California's commitment to a more intelligent scheme of water
control and usage."0 4 As a part of the Water Commission Act,
sections 1105 and 1106 were enacted by the California Legislature

98.
99.

Id.

100.

See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting that use plus derivative use immunity,

ILa

which protects the witness against the actual use of their compelled testimony and anything derived
therefrom, is sometimes loosely referred to as use immunity).

101. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of transactional
immunity and the extent to which it protects the witness to a greater degree than the Fifth
Amendment privilege).
102. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the coextensive nature of use
plus derivative use immunity with the Fifth Amendment privilege).
103. 1913 Cal. Stats., ch. 586, at 1012. The Act became the broad outline for the basic
provisions in today's California Water Code, being codified as a part of the Water Code in 1943.
1943 Cal. Stat., ch. 368, sec. 1003, at 1610.
104. See 1943 Cal. Stat., ch. 368, see. 1003 at 1610; Act of Aug. 10, 1913,1913 Cal. Stat., ch.
586, see. 45 at 1033.
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with little fanfare or discussion.105 Since the date of enactment,
sections 1105 and 1106 have only been minimally amended in order
to clarify the meaning of the provisions. 01 6 The basic concepts
stated in sections 1105 and 1106 have not changed in almost 80
years. At the time the California Legislature enacted sections 1105
and 1106 of the California Water Code, 7 transactional immunity
was the only constitutionally sanctioned type of immunity."0 8
Furthermore, the most recent amendment of section 1106"° was
before use plus derivative use immunity had been constitutionally
approved in 1972 by the KastigarCourt." 0 Consequently, because
section 1106 provides a broad grant of transactional immunity, it may
prevent more criminal prosecutions than are legally necessary by
giving the person more protection from prosecution than would be
provided had the witness claimed his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, or had section 1106 provided only use plus derivative use
immunity."'
Section 1105 of the California Water Code mandates that no
person shall be excused from testifying or from producing any

105. See Memorandum to Governor Warren from Ralph H. Cowing, Deputy Attorney General
(May 6, 1946) (discussing then Senate Bill 945 and stating that there was no objection to the legality
of the bill); Memorandum to Governor Warren from Ralph H. Cowing (May 11, 1943) (discussing
the codification of the Water Code and stating the vote as unanimous in both houses) (on file at the
California Archives Building).
106. See CAL. WATR CODE §§ 1105, 1106 (West 1971). Both sections were amended in 1957,
where "board" was substituted for "department," and the last time in 1970, where the change was
made to clarify "any penalty" in section 1105 to provide in section 1106 that no person would be
"criminally prosecuted or be subjected to any criminal penalty." 1957 Cal. Stat., ch. 1932, sec. 64,
at 3379; 1970 Cal. Stat., ch.773, sec. 1, at 1460. All code sections refer to the California Water Code

unless otherwise indicated.
107. See infra notes 112-29 and accompanying text (discussing sections 1105 and 1106 of the
California Water Code).
108. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (explaining that until Kastigarwas decided in
1972, transactional immunity was the only type of immunity that had been constitutionally

sanctioned).
109. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the most recent amendments to
section 1106 in 1970).

110. See supranotes 86-99 and accompanying text (discussing Kastigarand use plus derivative
use immunity).
111. This is especially true where, arguably under section 1080 of the California Water Code,
the person can request to subpoena themselves. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing

the lack of discretion by the Board and the mandatory language in the California Code of Regulations
§§ 763 and 649.6(a)).
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evidence before the California State Water Resources Control Board
(Board) on the grounds of self-incrimination."12 In addition, section

1105 provides that the witness may not be excused even where the
testimony or evidence required might tend to incriminate the witness
or subject the witness to any penalty.' This provision also grants

the power to compel testimony before any investigation or any

hearing by the Board.1
Section 1106 acts in conjunction with section 1105, by granting
transactional immunity to a witness compelled to testify under
section 1105.115 Section 1106 provides that no person shall be6
criminally prosecuted or subjected to any criminal penalty"
because of "any act, transaction, matter, or thing material to the
matter under investigation" 1 7 by the Board." 8 Under section
1106, only compelled testimony or evidence that is material to the
investigation or hearing is immune from prosecution." 9 Perjury is
112. CAL. WATER CODE § 1105 (West 1971). The section provides that:
No person shall be excused from testifying or from producing any evidence in any
investigation or inquiry by or hearing before the board upon the ground that the testimony
or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty.

Id
113. 1d; see supra note 106 (discussing the limitation of the "any penalty" language to mean
any criminal prosecution or penalty).
114. CAL. WATER CODE § 1105 (West 1971).
115. Id § 1106 (West 1971). The section provides that
No person shall be criminally prosecuted or be subjected to any criminal penalty for or
on account of any act, transaction, matter, or thing material to the matter under
investigation by the board concerning which he has been compelled as a witness to testify
or to produce documentary evidence; but no person so testifying or producing shall be

exempt from prosecution for any perjury committed by him in his testimony.
Id.; see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (defining and discussing transactional immunity).
116. See supranote 34 (citing authorities for the proposition that a witness is not immune from
civil penalties or general disgrace or other adverse effects).
117. The quoted phrase is substantially similar to the language of the Compulsory Testimony
Act of 1893, which was the basis of the federal and state transactional immunity statutes. See supra
notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing the language of the Compulsory Testimony Act,
which is substantially similar to the quoted language, as being interpreted by the Court in Brown to
provide the witness with absolute protection from criminal prosecution for any crimes implicated or
revealed by the witness's relevant testimony).
118.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971).

119. Id.; see LAFAVE & IsRAEL supra note 32, § 8.11, at 685 (explaining that immunity does
not reach to a transaction mentioned in an answer that is totally unresponsive to the question asked);
see also Comment, The Federal Witness Immunity Act in Theory and Practice: Treading the
ConstitutionalTightrope,72 YALE LJ. 1568, 1578-80 (1963) (stating that a witness cannot procure
immunity from prosecution for all previous criminal activities simply by mentioning those acts in the
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specifically exempted from the transactional immunity granted under
section 1106.120
Section 1106 compels testimony from a person 12 1 under two

circumstances. First, testimony is compelled when the person voluntarily appears before the Board and thereafter refuses to answer either
all or some of the questions on the ground that the answer may be
incriminating. 2 Second, testimony is compelled from a person
whom the Board subpoenas to testify or produce evidence before the
Board.'23 Under both of these circumstances, the language of

witness' testimony without regard to the subject matter to which the witness was asked to testify).
120. CAL. WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971); see United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115,
121-23 (1980) (holding that the perjury exemption under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 is not so narrow as to
prevent the prosecutor from using the witness' truthful immunized testimony, along with his false
immunized testimony, in establishing his perjury).
121. CAL WATER CODE § 19 (West 1971) (defining "person" as any person, firm, association,
organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or company).
122. See supranote 112 and accompanying text (discussing the language of § 1105 which does
not permit self-incrimination as a ground for refusal to testify).
123. CAL. WATER CODE § 1080 (West Supp. 1992) (provides that the California State Water
Resources Control Board may administer oaths and issue subpoenas for the attendance and giving
of testimony by witnesses and for the production of evidence in any proceeding in any part of the
state); CAL. WATER CODE § 13221 (West Supp. 1992) (giving regional boards the same power to
administer oaths and issue subpoenas as the State Board within their respective regions). Although
§ 1080 of the California Water Code states that the Board may issue subpoenas, the applicable
regulations appear to state that the Board must issue the subpena upon request. See CAL CODE REaS.
tit. 23 § 763 (1992); accordid. § 649.6(a) (1992) states in pertinent part:
Upon its own motion the board may, and upon the motion of any party the board shall,
issue a subpoena directed to any person requiring attendance at a particular time and place
to testify as a witness before the board. It may also require the person to bring to the
hearing any book, documents, and other things under the person's control which by law,
the person is bound to produce in evidence.
l (emphasis added). This is an important point because if the regulation is taken as mandatory, then
upon the request of a party the Board would have to issue a subpoena. Arguably, the Board would
have no discretion as to whether or not to issue the subpoena, no matter what the purpose for the
issuance of the subpoena; see infra notes 131-159 and accompanying text (discussing the East Bay
Municipal Utility District case, EBMUD's attempt to require the Board to issue a subpoena, and the
effect of application of §§ 1105 and 1106 of the California Water Code); see also CAL WATER CODE
§ 15 (West 1971) (providing that "shall" is mandatory and "may" is permissive); see, e.g., Shively
v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 480, 421 P.2d 65, 68, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1966) (holding that the
issuance of a subpoena is a ministerial act to which the agency has no discretion, but that the agency
can move to quash, vacate, or modify the subpoena in the superior court); National Auto and
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 76 Cal. App. 2d 415, 417, 173 P.2d 67, 68 (1946) (holding that the
act of issuing a subpoena by an agency is mandatory where the words 'shall' and 'may' were used
in the same section and the ordinary meaning presumably applies). But see Morris v. County of
Matin, 18 Cal. 3d 901,910 n.6, 559 P.2d 606, 612 n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. 251,257 n.6 (1977) (stating
that statutory language is an important determinant of legislative intent, but there are instances where
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sections 1105 and 1106 provides the basis for automatically applying
the statutes, since neither section requires the person to expressly
invoke the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in order
to receive the grant of immunity under section 1106.24 In addition,
sections 1105 and 1106 do not allow the Board the discretion to
determine whether or not the testimony or evidence is necessary to
a fair hearing or investigation, or whether if admitted the testimony
or evidence will jeopardize any other proceeding."2 Therefore, if
the sections are implicated, the person compelled to testify or
produce documents receives transactional immunity automatically,
possibly jeopardizing a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution
of that witness because the Board did not have the opportunity to
determine if the testimony or evidence was necessary to a Board
investigation or hearing.
Another important aspect of automatic application of the immunity statutes is the consequence that the automatic application may
have when applied to a corporation or other artificial organization. As
stated before, a corporation cannot claim the privilege against corn-

the language was not meant to foreclose an agency's discretion); 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 69 (1954)
(stating that "shall' is ordinarily a word of mandatory meaning, although it may be deemed directory
if the provisions of the statute, properly construed, appear to require it").
124. Although there have not been any reported cases interpreting §§ 1105 and 1106 of the
California Water Code, the United States Supreme Court and the California courts have interpreted
§§ similar in nature. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 430 (1943) (holding where the
witness was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury regarding alleged violations of the Sherman
Act, and the testimony touched upon the alleged offense, the witness obtains immunity pursuant to
the Sherman Act even though the witness did not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination). The Court in Monia further stated that upon testifying, the witness is
entitled to the immunity under the statute without first claiming the protection of the constitutional
privilege where there is no statutory requirement to do so. IdL; see also People v. King, 66 Cal. 2d
633, 642-43, 427 P.2d 171, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 571, 577 (1967) (holding that no Insurance Code
provision made the right to immunity conditional upon the assertion of privilege); McLain v. Superior
Court, 99 Cal. App. 2d 109, 117, 221 P.2d 300, 305 (1950) (holding that a witness subpoenaed to
appear before a legislative committee, without asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, was thereafter entitled to the immunity conferred by statute); People
v. Schwarz, 78 Cal. App. 561, 572, 248 P. 990, 994 (1926) (holding in part that witnesses who
appeared and testified pursuant to a subpoena, but did not invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, were still "compelled" to testify and were therefore guaranteed
immunity from prosecution granted by the statute).
125. See supranote 124 and accompanying text (discussing the probable automatic application
of §§ 1105 and 1106 when they are implicated preceding a Board investigation).
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pulsory self-incrimination.126 However, "person" is defined under
the California Water Code to include a corporation and other artificial organization. 27 Thus, although a corporation cannot claim a
Fifth Amendment privilege,12 8 a corporation or other artificial
organization is theoretically not precluded from receiving transactional immunity when it is subpoenaed by the Board where the
grant of immunity becomes automatic upon issuance of a subpoena.
Although it is theoretically possible for transactional immunity
under section 1106 to automatically apply to a corporation or artificial organization, there are no reported decisions involving such an
application under sections 1105 and 1106. However, one corporation
and its officers did attempt to secure the immunity granted under
section 1106 after they had been criminally charged.'2 9
Il. A RECENT APPuCATION OF CALFORNIA WATER CODE
SECTIONS 1105 AND 1106
In October 1987, the California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
(CSPA) filed a complaint before the California State Water Resources Control Board (Board) alleging that the East Bay Municipal
Utility District's (EBMUD) Camanche Reservoir water flow releases
inadequately protected the Mokelumne River steelhead and chinook
salmon runs.' The complaint alleged that the terms and conditions
of the water rights permits ordered by the Board for the Camanche

126. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the nonapplicability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to corporations).

127. See supra note 121 (defining 'person' to include corporations and other artificial
organizations).
128. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (indicating that the United States Supreme
Court has declared that a corporation may not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege).

129. See infra notes 130-158 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances of the East
Bay Municipal Utility District case and the implications of §§ 1105 and 1106 of the California Water
Code).
130. See Complaint of California Sportfishing Protection Alliance Before the State Water
Resources Control Board (October 23, 1987) [hereinafter referred to as "CSPA Complaint"] (on file

at the PacificLawJournab;see also State Water Resources Control Board, Notice of Public Hearing,
Complaint by CSPA against EBMUD's operations of Pardee and Camanche Reservoirs on the
Mokelumne River in San Joaquin and Calaveras Counties, July 23, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. and July 25,
1990 - if necessary, p.2 (June 13, 1990), [hereinafter referred to as "Notice of Public Hearing"] (on
file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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Reservoir and Pardee Reservoir did not protect or maintain the
fisheries resources and water quality of the Mokelumne River, and
that the conditions ordered were detrimental to the public trust
resources."' After an early hearing on the complaint, the Board
postponed any further action until the completion of the Department
of Fish and Game's (DFG) 1988 Mokelumne River fishery
report. 13 2 In the spring of 1990, the Board resumed its formal
review and presided over a meeting between EBMUD, DFG, and
CSPA, as well as other interested groups.133 Before the group could
meet again, however, the San Joaquin County District Attorney filed
a criminal complaint charging EBMUD and each of EBMUD's
directors, as well as the general manager, chief engineer, and
fisheries manager with misdemeanors for failing to release sufficient
water for fish below a dam, 3 4 discharging pollutants,'35 and
maintaining a nuisance. 36 The charges stemmed from a fish kill in
a DFG fish hatchery.13 7 Specifically, the criminal complaint alleged
that EBMUD mismanaged the lower Mokelumne River by polluting

131.
132.

See CSPA Complaint, supra note 130.
See Gregory Weber, EBMUD Faces CriminalChargesfor Fish Kill, I CAL. WATER L.

& POL'Y RPTR. 1, at 15 (1990) (discussing the circumstances that led to the filing of charges by the
San Joaquin County District Attorney).
133. Id. At that meeting, DFG presented interim flow recommendations from the Camanche
Reservoir into the lower Mokelumne river. I
134. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 5937 (West 1984) (requiring the owner of a dam to allow
sufficient water to pass through a fishway, or over or through the dam, at all times unless special
permission is granted by the Department of Fish & Game).
135. See i& § 5650(0 (West 1984) (making it unlawful to deposit, permit to pass into, or place
where it may pass into the waters of California, any substance or material deleterious to fish, plant

life, or bird life).
136. See Weber, supra note 132, at 15 (criminal charges were filed on May 10, 1990); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 372 (West 1988) (making the maintaining of a nuisance, the committing of a public
nuisance, or willful omission to perform any legal duty relating to the removal of a public nuisance,
a misdemeanor); see also State Water Resources Control Board, Notice of Pre-Hearing Conference,
Issuance of Subpoenas Granting Immunity with regard to the Hearing on the Complaint by the CSPA
Against EBMUD's Operations of Pardee and Camanche Reservoirs on the Mokelumne River in San
Joaquin and Calaveras Counties, June 26, 1990 at 1:00 p.m. (June 14, 1990) [hereinafter referred to
as "Notice of Pre-Hearing Conference7] (on file at the Pacific Law Journal); Telephone interview

with David Irey, Deputy District Attorney San Joaquin County (Nov. 20, 1991) (stating that by an
order of the San Joaquin County Municipal Court, the criminal records were sealed and destroyed
and therefore, the author is unable to cite to the complaint).
137. See Weber, supra note 132, at 15 (discussing the circumstances that led to the filing of
charges by the San Joaquin County District Attorney).
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the river, failing to allow the release of adequate water below the
dam, and maintaining this nuisance during the fall of 1989,
subsequently killing approximately 153,000 fish at the Mokelumne
Fish Hatchery near the base of the EBMUD-run Camanche Reservoir.13 The loss of the fish was alleged to be directly related to the
damaging effects of the water released from the Camanche Reservoir
by EBMUD.139 The allegation by the San Joaquin County District
Attorney was that the water contained levels of hydrogen sulfide and
for the existence of the
dissolved oxygen that were unsuitable
14
fisheries within the Mokelumne River. 1
The Board scheduled a hearing on CSPA's complaint for July
1990, after the criminal charges had been filed.'4 1 East Bay
Municipal Utility District unsuccessfully sought limited immunity
from the District Attorney for EBMUD's proposed testimony at the
Board hearing. 2 After failing to receive a grant of immunity from
the District Attorney, EBMUD sought administrative subpoenas from
the Board for the district itself, its directors, managers and
records. 4 3 East Bay Municipal Utility District sought the administrative subpoenas because if the administrative subpoenas had been
issued, any "person"' 44 subpoenaed would automatically have been

138. See EBMUD Faces Charges of Killing 153,000 Fish San Joaquin DA Files Criminal
Complaint, S. F. CHRON., May 11, 1990, at A6 (discussing the criminal charges and the reaction of
EBMUD); see also Water OfficialsRespond to 'Outrageous" Legal Charges,Wire, May 11, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire file (stating that EBMUD alleged that due to the drought,

the lake's surface elevation was below the top outlet, and EBMUD had been releasing water from
the bottom outlet of Camanche Reservoir); Comments to author's draft article by David _rey, Deputy
District Attorney San Joaquin County, 30 (March 20, 1992) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
139. See EBMUD Faces Charges of Killing 153,000 Fish San Joaquin DA Files Criminal
Complaint, S. F. CHRON., May 11, 1990, at A6 (discussing the criminal charges and the reaction of
EBMUD).

140.

l

141. See Notice of Public Hearing, supra note 130.
142. See Letter from Jeffery S. White, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, to Barbara Katz, State
Water Resources Control Board (June 20, 1990) (discussing the criminal case and the request for
subpoenas by EBMUD) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
143. ld.
144. See supra note 121 (providing the definition of "person' under California Water Code §

19).
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entitled to the transactional immunity granted in section 1106.145
Thus, EBMUD and all persons subpoenaed would have been immune
from prosecution as to any offense implicated or revealed by the
testimony that was material to the matter under investigation by the
1 46
Board.
On June 26, 1990, the hearing officer directed that the subpoenas
be issued, although the Board's power to issue subpoenas was supposedly not to be delegated to individual board members. 147 On
July 9, 1990, EBMUD notified the Board that it would petition for a
court order compelling the Board to issue the subpoenas if the Board
did not immediately issue them. 148 On July 10, 1990, upon DFG's
request, the Board indefinitely postponed the hearings that had been
scheduled for July 23 and 25, 1990.149 On July 11, 1990, the San
Joaquin County District Attorney agreed to dismiss five of the eight
criminal charges involving fish kills against EBMUD and all of the
criminal charges against the board members and officials.'50 The
three remaining charges against EBMUD were dismissed in accordance with a plea bargain negotiated in the fall of 1990.151

145. Motion to Issue Subpoenas, California Sport Fishing Protection Alliance v. East Bay
Municipal Utility District, Before the State Water Resources Control Board, dated June 26, 1990 (on
file at the Pacific Law Journal);see supra note 123 (discussing the issuance of subpoenas pursuant
to § 1080 of the California Water Code).
146. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971); see also supra notes 115-120 and
accompanying text (discussing § 1106 of the California Water Code).
147. Letter from Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel, California State Water Resources
Control Board, to author (February 18, 1992) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal);see State Water
Resources Control Board Resolution No. 90-16 (January 18, 1990) (delegating authority as set forth
in the document "Water Right Delegations to Board Members Individually, to The Executive
Director, and to The Chief, Division of Water Rights," which delegates the authority to issue
subpoenas to the Chief, Division of Water Rights at § 3.1.4).
148. See Weber, supra note 132, at 15 (discussing the circumstances that led to the filing of
charges by the San Joaquin County District Attorney).
149. Id,
150. Xd; see Mokelumne Fish Agreement, Wire, July 11, 1990, available in, LEXIS, Nexis
directory, Wire file (discussing the dismissal of the criminal charges and outlining the agreement).
151. See Gregory Weber, ChargesAgainst EBMUD Dismissed, 1 CAL. WATER LAW & POLY
RPTR. 4, at 77 (1991) (discussing the negotiated settlement and the events that lead to the dismissal
of the criminal charges); see also Comments to author's draft article by David Irey, Deputy District
Attorney San Joaquin County, 34 (March 20, 1992) (prior to any dismissal, and as a part of the
agreement, EBMUD and DFG were required to reach an agreement on reservoir operations and flow
releases for the fall and winter of 1990) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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The significance of the Camanche Reservoir and Mokelumne
River events is more apparent when followed to the point which was
avoided by the settlement. First, the evidence that was to have been
discussed at the Board hearing was substantially the same evidence
that would probably have been admitted during the criminal proceeding.152 Second, the hearing by the Board on the CSPA complaint was scheduled for July 1990 and EBMUD had requested the
administrative subpoenas on June 26, 1990, while the criminal
charges had been filed on May 10, 1990, and the charges were not
expected to be adjudicated before the Board's hearing date. 153
Thus, EBMUD and the individual defendants would likely have testified at the Board hearing before they would have had to appear in the
criminal action." Therefore, if the Board had issued the subpoenas
to EBMUD pursuant to section 1080 as requested by EBMUD, then
55
section 1105 would have attached to the "person" subpoenaed.
Thus, section 1106 would have6 automatically granted transactional
15
immunity to those "persons."
The transactional immunity provided under section 1106 would
imply that every person subpoenaed by the Board would be immune
from criminal prosecution for any offense implicated or revealed
either by the person's testimony or other compelled evidence, as long
as it was material to the hearing or investigation before the
Board.'57 Assuming that EBMUD would have had the same people
that were subpoenaed testify or produce evidence both before the
Board and at the criminal proceedings, the San Joaquin District
.152. See Notice of Public Hearing, supranote 130, (discussing the complaint by CSPA against
EBMUD for operations of the Pardee and Camanche Reservoirs on the Mokelume River in San
Joaquin and Calaveras Counties).
153. See supra notes 130 and 136 and accompanying text (stating the dates of the hearing and
the date the criminal charges were filed).
154. See supra note 142 (discussing the letter from Jeffery S. White, counsel for EBMUD, to
Barbara Katz, Board).

155.

See CAL. WAR CODE § 1080 (West Supp. 1992); i § 1105 (West 1971); supra notes

127-128 and aceompanying text (discussing language and effect of §§ 1105 and 1106 of the
California Water Code as they apply to "person").
156. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971); supra note 124 and accompanying text
(discussing applicability of § 1106 and the automatic operation of the section once the person is
compelled to testify under § 1105).
157. See supra notes 115-128 and accompanying text (discussing the language and effect of
California Water Code § 1106).
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Attorney could not have prosecuted those people because of the
section 1106 grant of immunity, whether or not they had anything
substantive to add to any hearing by the Board. The District Attorney
would also have been precluded from prosecuting the "people" that
testified or produced evidence if the District Attorney had tried to
have different witnesses testify or produce evidence than were
subpoenaed before the Board, because transactional immunity prohibits the criminal prosecution of the "people" compelled to testify
under section 1105 regardless of any independently acquired evidence against them. 58 Although there is nothing unconstitutional
in such a scenario, the broad protection provided by transactional
immunity from prosecution is unnecessary and thwarts California's
ability to prosecute violators of environmental regulations.
IV. EXAMINATION OF TRANSACTIONAL IMMuNrrY

UNDER THE CALFORmA WATER CODE iN LiGHT oF CAUFORNIA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
As California begins what looks to be its seventh year of drought,
the tension between the needs to supply water for fish and wildlife,
agriculture, and consumptive uses can only become more
intense."t 9 According to the authors of a report by the Pacific Institute,' for a hearing of the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Health and Environment, California has drained its
"reservoirs, overpumped [its] underground aquifers, and delayed

158. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of transactional
immunity on subsequent criminal proceedings).
159. See generally Virginia Ellis, Reservoirs' Level Is Reminder Of Drought'sGrip On State,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1992, at Part A, 1, col. 2; Richard C. Paddock, Farmers Fight Endangered

Species Act, L.A. Tura, Feb. 27, 1992, at 1,col. 3; Jennifer Warren, DistressedBy Drought: Lack
of Rain, Short Water Allocations Have Taken A Toll On Forests, Wildlife, LA. TIMES, Aug. 26,
1991, at 2, col. 1; Lou Cannon, Despite Rains,Cahfornia DroughtIs Unrelenting;5-Year Spell Has
Left Severe EnvironmentalDamage; Officials Fear Situation Will Worsen, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 14,
1991, at A3; John Lancaster, DroughtAdds Urgency To Calfornia Water Debate;Court Takeover
oflrrigationSystem Possible,WAsH. PosT, July 13, 1991, at A3 (examining the effect of the drought
on California).
160. CaliforniaDrought Takes Toll On Environment, PACIFIC INSTrTm REPORT, Fall 1991
(briefly discussing a report co-authored by Peter Gleick and Linda Nash regarding the severe drought
that Califomia has been experiencing since 1987).
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making the necessary hard choices about water policy. 161 As a
result, the report contends that California is starting to
see irreversible
162
changes to its "political and ecological landscape."
With increasingly limited water resources, another critical issue
becomes the quality of water available. 63 In California, the Board
is actively involved in the regulation of discharge and disposal of
toxic materials."' Toxic disposal is an area of environmental law
where statutory regulation and enforcement is increasing.165 These
conflicts and developments increase the possibility that criminal
charges might be brought for an environmental violation at the same
time the Board, or one of the nine Regional Boards, is investigating
the same events.
Since sections 1105 and 1106 provide an automatic grant of
transactional immunity once a "person" 10 is compelled to testify
or produce evidence material to the investigation, the criminal

161. Id at 3.
162. Id
163. See generally Eric L. Garner & Janice L. Weis, Coping With Shortages:Managing Water
In The 1990s and Beyond, 5 NAT. RESOURCEs & ENv'T. 26 (1991) (discussing the increased use of
water in California, while water supplies become more scarce and the need to have adequate water
quantity and quality to serve the purposes for which the water is required); William F. Pedersen Jr.,

Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 EcoLOGY L.Q. 69 (1988) (discussing the neglect of Congress
and the EPA of the basic structure of the Clean Water Act, and the need to protect water quality
fully); Craig M. Wilson, The State Board'sRole in Implementing The Water QualityAct of.1987, 144
PRAc. L.INsT. 109 (1987) (discussing the Clean Water Act as it was amended by the Water Quality
Act of 1987, with a focus on California's implementation of the Clean Water Act).
164. Letter from Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel, California State Water Resources
Control Board, to author (February 18,1992) (commenting on a draft article submitted to Mr. Sawyer
from the author) (on file at the Pacific Law Journa);see CAL. WATER CODE § 13375 (West Supp.
1992) (prohibiting the discharge ofradiological, chemical, orbiological warfare agents into the waters
of California); id, § 13376 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring a report to be filed for any person
discharging pollutants or dredge and fill material into the navigable water of the United States, and

requiring reports from owners or operators of publicly owned treatment works); UL§ 13387 (West
Supp. 1992) (making anyperson who intentionally ornegligently violates §§ 13375 or 13376, orwho
violates or introduces into the water a hazardous substance which the person knew or should have
known would cause personal injury or property damage, subject to criminal penalties).
165. See William R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview ofCaliforniaWater Rights and Water
Quality Law, 19 PAC. LJ.957, 1012-25 (1988) (discussing the increasing amount of regulation of
hazardous wastes in California). See generally Arthur D. Gunther, Enforcement In Your Backyard:
Implementation of California'sHazardous Waste ControlAct By Local Prosecutors,17 ECoLOGY
L.Q. 803 (1990) (discussing local enforcement of California's Hazardous Waste Act).

166. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (defining "person" under the California Water
Code § 19).
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prosecutor may have no advance warning that immunity is or might
be granted." In this situation, the prosecutor will be prohibited
from bringing any criminal charges for any crime implicated or
revealed by the person's compelled testimony or evidence where the
information was relevant to the investigation by the Board.' The
California Legislature can easily avoid these unnecessary conflicts
simply by repealing section 1105 and updating section 1106 to reflect
the United States Supreme Court decision in Kastigarwhich upheld
use plus derivative use immunity."
ProposedSolutions
Although transactional immunity remains a constitutionally valid
ground for the compulsion of testimony, present law also allows the
compulsion of testimony where use plus derivative use immunity is
granted.17 The difference in scope between use plus derivative use
immunity and transactional immunity is substantial.' When
granted, transactional immunity, in effect, pardons in advance any
crime which might be revealed by the witness's testimony."' The

167. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic. application of
§§ 1105 and 1106).
168. The prosecutor would also be prohibited from bringing any criminal charges if the
Regional Boards were conducting the investigation. See supra note 123 (discussing the Regional
Boards' power to investigate and issue subpoenas); see also supra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text (discussing the prohibition of criminal prosecution once transactional immunity has been granted
to the witness).
169. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of use plus
derivative use immunity granted in Kastigar);see also People v. Campbell, 137 Cal. App. 3d 867,
872, 187 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (1982) (discussing the history of immunity and the current protection
for an individual). It is also recommended that California Code of Regulations tit. 23 § 763 (1992);
accord id. § 649.6(a) (1992) be amended to delete the mandatory word "shall" and replace it with
the discretionary word 'may." This would ensure that the Board has the discretion to issue a
subpoena upon the motion of any party. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing §
1080 and the dispute as to the Board's discretion to issue an administrative subpoena); see also notes
82-85 and accompanying text (defining use plus derivative use immunity).
170. See supra notes95-98 and accompanying text (discussing Kastigar and use plus derivative
use immunity as being coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination).
171. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive differences
between transactional immunity and use plus derivative use immunity).
172. See ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 205(d) (discussing the functional differences between
transactional immunity and use plus derivative use immunity).
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Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not give
such a pardon, nor does it require one. 173 In contrast, use plus
derivative use immunity exists equally with the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, without any unnecessary advance pardon.17 Use plus derivative use immunity
prohibits the actual use of the testimony and any evidence derived
directly or indirectly from the compelled testimony. 75 Thus, the
difference is that of absolute prohibition of criminal prosecution
under transactional immunity, or the possibility of prosecution under
use plus derivative use immunity as long as the prosecutor can

demonstrate that the evidence was derived from an independent and
legitimate source. 17 6 Of the two types of immunity, only use plus
derivative use immunity places the witness in the same position as if
his or her constitutional privilege under the
the witness had claimed
177
Amendment.
Fifth
To remedy the conflict between the automatic grant of immunity
in a Board proceeding and the increasing frequency of criminal prosecution of environmental violators, the Legislature could substitute
use plus derivative use immunity for section 1106's grant of transactional immunity. 17' The substitution of use plus derivative use
immunity would allow the Board 79 to compel testimony or evidence before the Board at an investigation or hearing, yet the
immunity granted would not preclude a criminal prosecution from

173. See supra notes 16-38 and accompanying text (examining the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.

174. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing the coextensive nature of use
plus derivative use immunity with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-

incrimination).
175. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1991) (defining use plus derivative use
immunity); see also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (defining and discussing use plus
derivative use immunity and its scope).
176. See supranote 84-85 and accompanying text (examining the differences between use plus
derivative use immunity and transactional immunity); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text
(discussing use plus derivative use immunity and the burden on the prosecution to show that the
evidence produced at trial was not derived from the immunized testimony).
177. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text (discussing Kasdgarand the scope of use
plus derivative use immunity).
178. See CA. WATER CODE § 1106 (West 1971).
179. The amended statute would apply to the Regional Boards pursuant to § 13221 of the
California Water Code as is currently the case.
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being brought against the witness for any crime revealed by such
testimony or evidence."' An additional amendment to section 1106
could allow only those individual witnesses who validly invoke the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to testify or produce
evidence before the Board."" This would eliminate the possibility
of an artificial organization receiving a grant of immunity because,
under the Fifth Amendment, only a natural person can claim the
privilege.' 82 Furthermore, a valid invocation requirement would
remove one way in which automatic application of sections 1105 and
1106 creates an automatic linkage by making the grant of immunity
partially contingent upon a valid invocation of the Fifth Amendment
18 3
privilege.
Section 1106 should further be amended to provide the person
presiding over the Board proceeding' with the discretion to grant
immunity where the presiding person determines that the testimony
or evidence is necessary to a just or fair proceeding." 5 Such discretion by the Board will keep the statute from automatically

180. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of transactional
immunity as compared to use plus derivative use immunity).
181. Requiring a valid invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination would eliminate the possibility of a corporation being able to preclude itself from
criminal prosecution simply by being issued a subpoena and producing documents related to the
investigation, since the Supreme Court in George Campbell PaintingCorp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286,
288-89 (1968), stated that only a natural person can invoke the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination. Additionally, evidence which is not subject to the privilege would also not implicate
immunity. See 2 DAVID S. RuDsImN, r Ai., CmINAL CoNsrumoNAL LAw, 6.0211][a] (1990
& Supp. Oct. 1991) (stating that the privilege only applies to communications of a testimonial nature,
and therefore does not apply to physical attributes which may be incriminating).
182. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the non-application of the Fifth
Amendment to corporations).
183. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic application of

immunity statutes).
184. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (by a resolution of the State Board, only the
Chief of the Division of Water Rights is given the authority to issue subpoenas).
185. See Memorandum to William R. Attwater, Chief Counsel, State Water Resources Control
Board, from Andrew H. Sawyer, Senior Staff Counsel, State Water Resources Control Board, Nov.
9, 1990 (discussing the circumstances when the State Water Board could refuse to issue a subpoena
requested by a party, and suggestions for proposed legislative modification to the grant of immunity
to witnesses under § 1106) (on file at the PacificLaw Journal);see also People v. Estrada, 176 Cal.
App. 3d 410,418,221 Cal. Rptr. 922,926 (1986); People v. Sutter, 134 Cal. App. 3d 806. 814-17,
184 Cal. Rptr. 829, 833-35 (1982) (holding that the defendant has the right to present any witness
the defendant may choose, but the defendant does not have the right to force the state to grant

immunity nor offer the witness immunity).
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applying to a witness who requests an administrative subpoena. It
would also give the Board the opportunity to determine whether or
not the offered testimony or evidence is necessary and not likely to
jeopardize any other proceeding. This provision would also remove
the automatic linkage that is currently created under sections 1105
and 1106 where the Board has no discretion to decide if the testimony
of the subpoenaed witness is necessary to the proceeding.'
Currently under section 1106, it is possible for the witness to request
the administrative subpoena for him or herself, and if the subpoena
is issued because of the Board's apparent lack of discretion,18 7 the
witness seemingly grants transactional immunity to him or herself
without any judgment by the Board.

The necessity of statutes assuring the availability of testimony
and documentary evidence in Board proceedings is legitimate.
However, such statutes need not go so far as to protect individuals
from criminal prosecution. Section 1106 could be amended as
follows (retained original portion in bold,188 amended portion
italicized):
A witness who validly claims the privilege against compulsory selfincriminationprior to testifying or producing documentary evidence,
whose testimony or documentary evidence the board,in its discretion,
determinesto be necessaryforajustandfairproceeding,
shall not have
any testimony,documentaryevidence,act, transaction, matter, or thing
material to the matter under investigation by the board concerning
which he has been compelled as a witness to testify or to produce
documentary evidence, used directly against the witness nor any
evidence derived either directly or indirectlyfrom such testimony or
documentaryevidence, in any criminalcase againstthe witness; but no
person so testifying or producing shall be exempt from prosecution

186.

See supranotes 123-125 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic application of

§§ 1105 and 1106, and the lack of Board discretion for approval or disapproval of the issuance of
subpoenas).
187. See supranote 123 and accompanying text (discussing the may/shall problem in California
Code of Regulations).
188. See supra note 115 (providing the text of the current § 1106 in full).
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and punishment for any perjury committed by him in his
18 9

testimony.

If section 1106 is amended as suggested above, section 1105 will
no longer be necessary and should be repealed. Section 1105 would
not be necessary because if the Board has the discretion to determine
that the witness' testimony or documentary evidence is not necessary
to the investigation or hearing, the witness cannot be compelled to
testify or produce evidence over a claim of the witness' Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. If immunity is
not granted to protect the witness to the same extent as the Fifth
Amendment privilege, then the compulsion to testify or produce evidence cannot be valid."9 However, the witness may be compelled
to testify, and not be granted use plus derivative use immunity, under
the amended statute where the witness does not validly invoke his or

189. The suggestion for amendment in the text of the article is from the author. An enclosure
with a letter from Andrew H. Sawyer, Assistant Chief Counsel, California State Water Resources
Control Board, to the author (Febnuary 18, 1992), provided Mr. Sawyer's recommendation for
amendment to the Board (on file at the Pacific Law Journa). The recommendation to the Board from
Mr. Sawyer was as follows (original § 1106 in strikeout, amendment underlined):

No persei. shall be zrrninaily preseated e b heead !a mny errmna peaalty for er
mn

A...ut

zf any aet; ktraetieftn,

ar,

of t4ffig Matefil to ti

matter. undef

hoh hc has been eempzllzd as a mitaess te tzztif
zrdancnn
n~~~oct~~~h gewnb
er t: predusz deeementWr zeideaeez but no perea s ietfing er predusing shall be
exempt frcem prwzZeutiefn and puntihmzft fmr ang~jr
zutd
by him in bi
testknefThe board may grant inunity to a witness compelled to testify or to produce
documentary evidence in any board proceeding who validly invokes the privilege against
self-incrimination. If the board does not grant immunity, the person shall be excused from
giving any testimony or from groducing any evidence to which the privilege against selfincrimination applies. and the board shall dismiss, continue, or limit the scoe of the
proceedines as necessary to assure that the unavailability of the testimony or evidence
does not deny due process of law to any party. If testimony or the production of evidence
is given pursuant to a erant of immunity from the board, no responsive answers or other
responsive evidence compelled after a valid claim of the privilege against selfincrimination, or any information directly or indirectly derived from that testimony or
other evidence, may be used aeainst the person in a criminal case. Nothing in this section
exempts any person from prosecution or punishment for periury or for giving a false
statement committed in so testifvin.
Mr. Sawyer further recommends that § 1105 should be repealed if § 1106 is amended as stated
above. Id
190. See supranotes 94-98 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court in Kastigar
held that a grant of immunity must at least be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination to be valid).
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her Fifth Amendment privilege. If the witness does not claim his or
her Fifth Amendment privilege, the testimony or evidence produced
is deemed to have been voluntarily given.191
If the amended section 1106 had been in place during the
192
EBMUD case, the outcome might have been quite different.
Initially, EBMUD would not have been able to automatically receive
immunity by simply requesting an administrative subpoena from the
Board. 93 If EBMUD had requested administrative subpoenas,
under the proposed version of section 1106, the Board would have
had the discretion to determine what testimony or evidence was necessary to ajust and fair proceeding, and then subpoena those witnesses
and their specific evidence. Even at that point, the witnesses would
not automatically receive immunity under the proposed version
section 1106. The witnesses would have been required to first validly
invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege before they testify or produce the evidence.' 94 This requirement would have precluded
EBMUD, as the district, from receiving immunity because it is not a
natural person. Additionally, under the proposed amendment, the
Board may determine whether or not receiving the testimony of the
witness would jeopardize any other criminal proceeding against that
witness, and if so, deny the witness immunity and forego receiving
testimony from the witness at that time. If the witness's testimony is
necessary to the Board investigation or hearing, the Board may postpone the hearing or investigation until there is no further conflict for
the witness. Therefore, if the proposed amendments to section 1106
had been in place, the Board would have had the discretion to either
subpoena those witness's that were necessary to the investigation

191.

See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1,7-10 (1970) (holding that when an individual is

under compulsion to make disclosures as a witness, and where that witness revealed information
instead of claiming the privilege, that witness lost the benefit of the privilege); Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (stating that unless a witness objects to answering the questions
propounded, a government ordinarily may assume that its compulsory processes are not extracting
testimony that the witness deems to be incriminating and if the witness instead discloses the
information sought, any incriminations are properly viewed as not being compelled).
192. See supra notes 130-158 and accompanying text (discussing EBMUD case).
193. Id.
194. See supranote 89 and accompanying text (stating proposed amendments to § 1106- both

versions).
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without jeopardizing the criminal action, or postpone the hearing
until the criminal action had been adjudicated. Under either scenario,
the San Joaquin County District Attorney would have been able to
proceed with the criminal case against those witness, and the utility
district itself.
V. CONCLUSION

Currently, section 1106 of the California Water Code grants
transactional immunity to any person who is compelled to testify or
produce evidence before the California State Water Resources
Control Board, so long as the evidence is material to the Board's
investigation or hearing.195 This broad guarantee against criminal
prosecution is unnecessary to compel testimony from an unwilling
witness who invokes his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. The protection granted under
transactional immunity statutes is far greater than that guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, a use plus derivative use
immunity statute which protects the witness from the direct or
indirect use of his or her testimony or evidence, protects the witness
to the same extent as the Fifth Amendment. A repeal of section 1105
of the California Water Code and a legislative amendment to section
1106, granting use plus derivative use immunity to those witnesses
who validly invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege, and granting
discretion to the Board as to the statute's application, would continue
to provide for the legitimate compulsion of testimony or documentary
evidence when necessary, yet would do so without flatly prohibiting
criminal prosecution against the compelled witness.
TamaraL Boeck

195. See supra notes 115-25 and accompanying text (discussing § 1106 as it is currently
written).
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